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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
BISSELL DULLES GRAY MERCHANT	Aug. 12, 1960	MONGOOSE Special Group ✓

OCCURRENCE:

On August 12, 1960 the Special Group heard a summary of the budget for Cuban operations from MR. BISSELL. Approximately [redacted] million dollars were required to finance Cuban operations for the fiscal year and a balance of [redacted] was necessary for the remainder of the fiscal year. Major subheadings in the budget were (1) political action, (2) propaganda, (3) paramilitary, (4) intelligence collection, (5) counterintelligence, (6) communications support, (7) support.

It was agreed "This matter should be laid before the appropriate higher authorities and a presentation would be arranged hopefully within the next 10 days. This was believed to be wise, not because any

(continued)

SOURCE: Minutes of Special Group meeting August 12, 1960

FILE: Cage

STAFF: Robert Kelley

DATE: June 29, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
	Oct. 6, 1960	Special Group MONGOOSE Presidential Authorization Card 3 of 3

OCCURRENCE: (cont.)

including some Germans in this group and that we would talk informally to General Gehlen about it. He emphasized that he was asking for no Special Group approval at this time in this specific connection."

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:	STAFF:
Minutes of Special Group meeting October 6, 1960	Bob Kelley
FILE: Cage	DATE: June 29, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
PRESIDENT KENNEDY HELMS MCCONE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD	July 25,1962	SPECIAL GROUP MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE: Helms notes that McCone briefed the panel of the President's foreign intelligence advisory board on political action projects. He pointed out that "each project must have his approval to the circulation to the members of the Special Group". For example, reconnasiance overflights are now approved. He noted covert financial support in Peruvian, Greek, Finnish, Italian, and Brazilian elections. Helms "read to the panel a paper on the operation Mongoose which theDirector had used earlier in the day for giving a briefing to the President."

SOURCE: Memorandum for the record, re meeting on CA matters with the panel of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board of Helms, dated July 25, 1962 (00870)

FILE:

STAFF: diGenova

DATE: 7/3/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
LANSDALE,	Mar 2, 1962 Nov 30, 1961	Special Group Mongoose

OCCURRENCE: Lansdale traces the history of the project from its inception on Nov. 30, 1961 through March 1, 1962. Under the latter date, he notes, "The Chief of Operations /Lansdale/is to report to the President through the Special Group (NSC 5412 Augmented by the Attorney General and the Chairman, JCS); the Special Group will be responsible for providing policy guidance for approving important operations, and for monitoring progress." (00181) Lansdale also submitted an intelligence plan for basic intelligence collection upon which to base the decision to undertake actions to cause the overthrow of Castro. ~~The plan itself at pages 00183 through 00187, included establishing intelligence agents~~ inside Cuba; collecting intelligence from Cubans inside the United States; counterfeiting ration cards and currency inside of Cuba; geographical surveys of air fields, military installations, communications centers; attempts to place trained agents inside the government organizations or to defect officials "in place"; and [negotiating for British help in contaminating lubricants and fuels to cripple Cuban transportation. "The British want to know, 'how serious are you?', before risking their assets to help the U.S.".] (00180-00187)

SOURCE: Program review by Brig. Gen. Lansdale, Mar 2, 1962 on the Cuba Project (00180-00187)

FILE:

STAFF: di Genova

DATE: June 30, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
(continuation)		Card 3 of 4

OCCURRENCE: CARD 3

"CIA has initiated action to contaminate POL supplies for Cuba, although visible results (stopage of some Cuban transports) is not expected until mid-1962. [redacted] A similar project was noted for jet fuel storage tanks in Cuba. Lansdale noted that the CIA had concluded that its realistic role should be to at least create the illusion of a popular movement, to win external support for it, to improve CIA operational capability, and to help create a climate which will permit provocative actions in support of a shift to overaction. Lansdale wanted them to reevaluate to see whether or not they could make a greater effort. An outline of what the 33 tasks are for each of the entitities involved then follows in Lansdale's memo. The memorandum notes that the President directed that the Chief of Operations conduct the project through the appropriate organizations and departments of the government. In this regard the memo notes "Also, CIA apparently believes that its role should be to create and expand a popular

SOURCE:	STAFF:
FILE:	DATE:

TOP SECRET

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
CARD 3		Card 3 of 3

OCCURRENCE: (continued from Memo for the Special Group re: Cuba Project, Jan. 24, 1962
detectives and foreign police officials." (00106)
In regard to Task #7 of General Lansdale's review this memo notes, "Moreover, the development of a resisitence movement will not remain controllable, so that operational time tables produced during the next four weeks can serve only as guides for a proposed sequence of actions." (00107)
The memorandum notes that six men to form the initial nucleus for work for inside Cuba have been assessed in depth. Fifteen locations have been selected as suitable centers for resistence. It was also noted that in support of State's efforts, CIA has conducted propaganda operations including a number of mass demonstrations in [redacted].

SOURCE: **TOP SECRET** STAFF:

FILE: DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES: ✓
LANSDALE, Y,	Mar 13, 1962	Special Group Augmented ✓ MONGOOSE CUBA

Card 1 of 2

OCCURRENCE: The planning for Operation MONGOOSE was prepared on a format of separate planning for each department and agency involved. Revised planning along that line was submitted with this memorandum. Activities already approved were marked with an asterisk. Approved were dispatching one intelligence agent operation to a key area selected by the CIA, ("Many of the agents infiltrated into Cuba will be trained for paramilitary skills as well as intelligence collection,...However, CIA has noted that, once the agents are inside Cuba, they cannot be controlled effectively from outside Cuba, although every effort will be made to attempt such control.") (00207), Carribbean Admissions Center Opa-Locka, Florida. Periodic intelligence estimates, continued negotiating for [British] help in contaminating locamotive lubricants, two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba approved for March 16-31, 1962, develop intelligence potential of Cuban "colonies" in U.S., develop additional interrogation centers in other areas by 31 March 1962 in South America and

SOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented from Lansdale re: Institutional Planning, Operation MONGOOSE, 13 March 1962 (00206-00213)

FILE:

STAFF: di Genova
DATE: July 1, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
~~SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE~~, Lansdale, TAYLOR, JOHNSON, GILPATRICK, MCCONE, RFK, LEMNITZER, ROIG, RUSK, KOHLER, HURWITCH	June 20, 1962 ~~July 31, 1962~~ ~~June 12, 1962~~ ~~May 17, 1962~~ June 22, 1962	Special Group Augmented MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE:

Due to reports of popular unrest, political strife, and economic disruptions inside Cuba, it was suggested that the Special Group Augmented consider the value of having an SNIE on Cuba made in the immediate future. The CIA has agreed as a matter of priority to reach a stage in the interrogation of Pedro Roig where he can be surfaced to make public charges of Cuban Communist operations against Latin American nations. For operational effectiveness, the CIA has selected a new area in Cuba for its initial radio broadcasts from a submarine for "Voice of Cuba." The Navy states that the new area is feasible and State has concurred in the theme and content of the broadcast. They will take place around the end of the month. No proposals for actions by the Department of State have been submitted since the appointment of State's special representative, Mr. Hurwitch. They are expected on June 22, 1962.

SOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented from Lansdale re: Progress, Operation MONGOOSE, 20 June 1962 (00397-00398)

FILE:

STAFF: di Genova

DATE: July 1, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
~~SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE~~, Lansdale, TAYLOR, JOHNSON, GILPATRICK, MCCONE, RFK, LEMNITZER, ROIG, RUSK, KOHLER, HURWITCH	June 20, 1962 ✓ ~~July 31, 1962~~ ~~June 12, 1962~~ ~~May 17, 1962~~ June 22, 1962	Special Group Augmented ✓ MONGOOSE

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SOURCE:	STAFF:
Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented from Lansdale re: Progress, Operation MONGOOSE, 20 June 1962 (00397-00398)	di Genova
FILE:	DATE: July 1, 1975

NO OBJECTION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
defer to NSA
1/6/94

Reviewed by NSA
on 1/10/94
Release in Part
★ should be marked
SECRET SPOKE

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
~~SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE,~~ LANSDALE, ~~TAYLOR, JOHNSON, GIL-PATRICK,~~ MCCONE, RFK, ~~LEMNITZER,~~	July 11, 1962	Special Group Augmented ✓ MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE: Notice to Special Group that operational representatives are preparing assessments of Operation MONGOOSE. These will cover among other things "factors worth considering in deciding on a future course of action (We have a working definition of four possible future courses of action)." Memo quotes NSA summary on intelligence problems which notes that "Intelligence has been obtained of Soviet participation in Cuban tactical air training, Cuban air defense performance, and the presence of Soviet-type air defense equipments." sec 6(1)(b)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented from Lansdale re: Progress OPERATION MONGOOSE 11 July 1962 (00428-00430)

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE: di Genova
July 2, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
LANSDALE, HARVEY, ~~MONGOOSE, SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED~~ CARD ONE OF TWO	July 24, 1962 ~~July 11, 1962~~ ~~July 31, 1962~~ ~~July 23, 1962~~ ~~March 16, 1962~~	MONGOOSE Special Group Augmented

OCCURRENCE: As to Phase I, CIA staff personnel up to 477 are devoting full time to this effort. "A very large number of additional personnel are devoting part time efforts to Operation MONGOOSE." Hard intelligence coverage of Cuba has been developed. Fifty-nine controlled agents inside of Cuba exist. Not so successful on infiltrating intelligence reporting in resistence cadre teams. Failure to meet the original schedule of team in~~filtrations primarily was due to two factors: "(a) Lack of policy approval by higher~~ authority to make any extensive utilization of Department of Defense personnel and support." "Had we been permitted to mount a more intensive and agressive, the original infiltration schedule probably would have been met, possibly exceeded." The speed and extent of future infiltration teams for resisitence purposes into Cuba "will of course depend upon policy approvals by higher authority and the amount of support we can count on thereunder." "It is our opinion that there is an excellent chance such a revolt could be incited

(CONTINUED)

SOURCE: Memorandum for Lansdale from William K. Harvey re: Operation MONGOOSE--end of Phase I, July 24, 1962 (00452-00458)

FILE:

STAFF: di Genova

DATE: July 2, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Gen. Lansdale William K. Harvey	8/7/62	SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED OPERATION MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE:

Harvey states that the estimated cost of CIA in terms of personnel assigned full-time to Operation Mongoose would have to be increased to at least 600 (if stage two of Mongoose went into effect) and that the estimated fiscal budgets for 1963 and 1964 would have to be increased to over $100 million.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:	Aug 8, 1962 memo from Gen Lansdale to the Special Group Augmented (00587)	STAFF:	Wallach
FILE:		DATE:	July 2, 1975

TOP SECRET

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
MCCONE CASTRO		MONGOOSE SGA ✓

OCCURRENCE:

MCCONE TESTIFIED that the SGA approved a program to contaminate with Carbon dust [redacted] This was to be done at the time of shipment. The program met with some success. MCCONE could not recall where the actual sabotage of the purchased equipment took place (22-23).

SOURCE: McCone, Testimony, 6/6/75

STAFF: Rhea

FILE:

DATE: 6/27/75

NO OBJECTION w/NSA Concurrence
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Reviewed by NSA
on 1/10/94 [illegible]
Release in part

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
HELMS, LANSDALE,	Feb. 1, 1962	Special Group Augmented ✓ MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE: Memo for Richard Helms from Gen. Lansdale concerning NSA cover. The memo alludes to a conversation on the previous day, Jan. 31, 1962, about NSA cover for the Cuba Project. It indicates that Cuba cover is top priority. It indicated that this was not possibly known to the members of the United States Intelligence Board. The problem seemed to be to be able to decide how much of NSA (National Security Agency)'s assets were needed to provide cover for the Cuban project.

Sec 6(1)
(b)(c)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Memorandum for Richard Helms from Brig. Gen. Lansdale, dated Feb. 1, 1962 (00122)

FILE:

STAFF: di Genova

DATE: June 29, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
MURPHY, DULLES, MERCHANT, GRAY, IRWIN	11/4/59	MONGOOSE SPECIAL GROUP ✓

OCCURRENCE:

Special group meeting on November 4, 1959, discuss the "Cuba Propaganda Project". 1. Mr. Dulles "went into details as to the possible location of radio transmitters" commenting that since the discussion of the program last week the situation had grown more critical." 2. Mr. Gray said "he was sure (the project) would meet with high level approval provided that any action taken was acceptable to the [redacted]"

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Memorandum for record dated 4 Nov 1959, Minues of Special Group Meeting.

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE: KELLEY

6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
MERCHANT GATES GRAY DULLES	Nov. 18,1959	MONGOOSE SPECIAL GROUP ✓

OCCURRENCE:

On November 18, 1959, the Special Group Meeting, the Group, "agreed with the 'Cuba Propaganda' operation as outlined by Mr. DULLES. DULLES asked for approval of an operation based in [redacted]. These broadcasts were to be attributed "such that Cubans would be talking to Cubans" and the broadcasting equipment would not be adeqaute to reach other parts of Latin America. However, DULLES pointed out "we are using the capability to place unattributed propaganda and publications throughout the area..."

SOURCE: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 18 Nov. 1959

FILE:

STAFF: KELLEY

DATE: 6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
MERCHANT GRAY IRWIN BISSELL	Dec. 9, 1959	SPECIAL GROUP ✓ MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE:

On December 9, 1959, the Special Group continued discussion of the clandestine broadcasting to Cuba. Mr. BISSELL explained that it would not be possible to place the transmitter in [redacted] and there was discussion of alternate sites including three U.S. islands in the general area, the Canal Zone, and [redacted] or [redacted] soil.
"It was recognized that any radio broadcasting from [redacted] would undoubtedly be used by [redacted] to further his fight with TRUJILLO, but the group agreed that this was not necessarily a drawback. "

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Minutes of Special Group Meeting, December 9, 1959

FILE:

STAFF: KELLEY

DATE: 6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE, LANSDALE, TAYLOR, JOHNSON, GIL-PATRICK, MCCONE, RFK, LEMNITZER Harris Craig	June 27, 1962 ~~June 21-23, 1962~~ 7/1/62 6/21-23/62	Special Group Augmented MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE: One infiltration team introduced into Oriente Province on June 4 and 5, 1962 reported that Cuban security measures made operations in that area difficult. Raul Castro on June 25 reported that the four had been captured and two had been executed, but to this date the report is not accepted as fact. June 21-22, 1962 a Marine operation to emplace a cache of arms and demolitions was accomplished without incident. The defector, Roig, [redacted] ~~Effective July 1,~~ 1962 Brig. Gen. B.T. Harris, U.S. Army will replace Brig. Gen. Craig as DOD operations representative.

SOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented from Lansdale re: Operation MONGOOSE, June 27, 1962 (00399-00400)

FILE:

STAFF: di Genova

DATE: July 1, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE, LANSDALE, TAYLOR, JOHNSON, GILPATRICK, MCCONE, RFK, LEMNITZER Harris Craig	June 27, 1962 ~~June 21-23, 1962~~ 7/1/62 6/21-23/62	Special Group Augmented MONGOOSE

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SOURCE:	STAFF:
Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented from Lansdale re: Operation MONGOOSE, June 27, 1962 (00399-00400)	di Genova
FILE:	DATE: July 1, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE, LANSDALE, TAYLOR, JOHNSON, GIL-PATRICK, MCCONE, RFK, LEMNITZER Harris Craig	June 27, 1962 ~~June 21-23, 1962~~ 7/1/62 6/21-23/62	Special Group Augmented MONGOOSE

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SOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented from Lansdale re: Operation MONGOOSE, June 27, 1962 (00399-00400) FILE:	STAFF: di Genova DATE: July 1, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
~~SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED~~ ~~MONGOOSE~~, TAYLOR, RFK, JOHNSON, GILPATRICK, MCCONE, CARTER, LEMNITZER, LANSDALE, CLINE, PARROTT	July 12, 1962 ~~July 20, 1962~~ ~~April 9, 1963~~	Special Group Augmented ✓ MONGOOSE (CARD ONE OF TWO)

OCCURRENCE:

Lansdale briefed the group on numbers of agents in Cuba. Air resupply proposal submitted by CIA "should be deferred pending broader review of the entire situation." Taylor noted if urgent need for air supply proposal could be made to the Special Group Augmented at any time. "Mr. McCone emphasized that no high-level penetrations of the Cuban government have yet been attained." "The Attorney General inquired about the status of popular support for Castro, and also the possibility of a revolt against him." Lansdale replied, "There is no rallying point for active opposition." The AG and Johnson emphasize need to obtain hard intelligence on subversive activities by Castro in the hemisphere. A complete review of MONGOOSE was set toward the end of July. Taylor emphasized need for summaries of results "and a statement of future alternatives open to the U.S. should be developed." Looking into proposal to subsidize Japanese purchases of Dominican sugars so that the Japanese could divert these purchases from Cuba. McCone said that his experts had informed him that from a legal point of view, CIA could use unvouchered funds to support an operation of this kind. He cautioned,

SOURCE: Memo for the record, Minutes of the Special Group (Augmented) meeting 12 July 1962 re: Operation MONGOOSE, (00031-00032)

STAFF: (continued)

di Genova

FILE:

DATE: July 2, 1975